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1. Introduction
Do factor prices vary across regions within a country? This question
is of fundamental importance to governments pursuing policies for regional
development, firms choosing plant locations, and workers deciding where to
live. Economic theory suggests two powerful mechanisms promoting factor
price convergence across regions and countries — goods trade and factor
mobility. Within a country, goods markets are more highly integrated,
and factors of production are more mobile, than they are across countries.
As a result, factor price equalization, to the extent it exists anywhere, is
more likely to occur within nations than internationally. We develop very
general tests of absolute and relative factor price equalization and apply
them to regions within the United Kingdom. The UK is a particularly
well-suited focus for such tests given its small geographic area and high
population density, conditions which promote output and factor market
integration.
Absolute factor price equality implies that identical factors of produc-
tion are paid the same wage across regions. Relative factor price equality,
on the other hand, allows absolute wages to vary so long as relative wages
(i.e. the skill premium) remain constant. An obvious potential explanation
for a violation in absolute factor price equality is the existence of regional
Hicks-neutral productivity diﬀerences: regions with higher Hicks-neutral
productivity can oﬀer higher wages to both skilled and unskilled workers
even while relative wages remain uniform.
Rejection of factor price equality can also arise for more complicated
reasons. For example, both absolute and relative factor price equality can
fail due to unobserved variation in regional factor quality. Analyzing the
eﬀect of such variation on output and wages has a long history in the in-
ternational trade literature, including the classic paper by Leontief (1953)
and the more recent cross-country study by Trefler (1993). A key advan-
tage of the methodology that we develop is its robustness to unobserved
diﬀerences in factor quality. Indeed, our tests control for factor quality
diﬀerences across pairs of regions and industries.
Our approach is based upon extremely general conditions for producer
equilibrium and builds upon techniques developed by Bernard and Schott
(2001) to test for factor price equality in the US. We generalize that theo-
retical framework from the case of the CES production technology to any
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constant returns to scale technology, to allow for unobserved factor quality
diﬀerences that are region-industry specific rather than just region-specific,
and to the case of imperfect competition. Our methodology exploits the
fact that, although an empirical researcher will not typically observe factor
quality or quality-adjusted factor prices, observed factor prices contain in-
formation about the quality of observed factors when firms minimize costs.
Our approach does not make any assumptions regarding the preferences
and costs of living faced by diﬀerent types of workers. As a result, it is
robust to unobserved variation in consumer price indices specific to types
of workers or locations. Nonetheless, the analysis has implications for the
value of real wages and the degree of factor mobility across locations.
Though our technique is applicable to any number of factors of produc-
tion, we focus here on the wages of skilled versus unskilled labour. We find
strong evidence against both absolute and relative factor price equality in
the UK. This rejection exists across both coarsely-aggregated Administra-
tive Regions and much more finely-defined Postcode Areas, which approxi-
mate local labour markets. Estimated diﬀerences in quality-adjusted factor
prices across the UK are highly statistically significant and quantitatively
important.
We explore a number of potential explanations for deviations from fac-
tor price equality. One subset of explanations provide intuition for the
failure of factor price equality. Among these are the existence of multiple
Heckscher-Ohlin cones of diversification within the UK and several aspects
of the new economic geography. We also consider how data-related issues
can induce a rejection of the null hypothesis. In each case, we highlight
additional empirical implications which can be pursued.
Existing tests of factor price equality, including Cunat (2001), Debaere
and Demiroglu (1997), Repetto and Ventura (1998), and Schott (2001a,
2001b), have focused on the variation of wages across countries or the
existence of multiple cones of diversification in international production
data. Other studies, including Davis et al. (1997), Bernstein and Wein-
stein (2002) and Hanson and Slaughter (2002), have looked for evidence of
factor price equalization across either Japanese prefectures or US states.
Further research on the spatial variation of productivity and factor prices
in the United States includes Ciccone and Hall (1996), Ciccone (2001), and
Hanson (1998). With respect to the UK, recent work by Cameron and
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Muellbauer (2000,2001), Duranton and Monastiriotis (2001), Gosling et al.
(1996), HM Treasury (2001), and Machin (1996) has examined the extent
of regional earnings and productivity diﬀerences across regions. Haskel
and Slaughter (2001) analyze the impact of international trade on wage in-
equality at the level of the United Kingdom as a whole. Though some of
this research has found evidence consistent with a violation of factor price
equality, none of the studies has controlled for the sort of variation in factor
quality and technology diﬀerences that we find so important. Our study
is also the first to examine the finely defined UK Postcodes in addition to
the coarsely aggregated Administrative Regions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the general
theoretical framework and derives empirical tests for absolute and relative
factor price equalization. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses
the econometric specification, and Section 5 presents the empirical results.
Section 6 examines a number of potential explanations for violations of
absolute and relative factor price equality. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Production
We consider a very general specification of the production environment
facing firms that allows for both perfect competition and imperfect compe-
tition, as well as variation in goods prices, technology, and factor quality
across regions and industries. Regions are denoted by r, industries by j,
and time by t. Throughout the exposition, subscripts are used to refer to
industries or regions and superscripts to refer to factors of production or
pairs of factors.
In each industry-region, firms choose output and employment of factors
of production to maximize profits subject to a constant returns to scale
production technology,
Πrj = vrj(Yrj)Yrj −wPr Prj −wNr Nrj − wKr Krj (1)
Yrj = ArjFj(Prj , Nrj ,Krj) (2)
where v is the output price, P is employment of quality-adjusted production
workers, N is employment of quality-adjusted non-production workers, and
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K is employment of quality-adjusted physical capital. The factor prices wPr ,
wNr , and wKr are per quality-adjusted unit of a factor of production.
In this specification, firms may either act as price-takers in product
markets (perfect competition) or choose prices subject to a downward slop-
ing demand curve (imperfect competition). They behave as price-takers
in factor markets. Although the main exposition here assumes constant
returns to scale, later sections and an appendix introduce increasing re-
turns to scale and discuss their implications for absolute and relative factor
prices.
For clarity, we have concentrated here on the three factors of production
for which data are available. However, the analysis makes no assumptions
about the relative number of goods and factors of production. We present
a general methodology for testing factor price equalization given data on
factor prices, employment, and output for arbitrary numbers of goods and
arbitrary numbers of factors of production.
2.2. Quality-adjusted and Observed Factors
If it were possible to observe quality-adjusted factor prices and quan-
tities in the data, we could test for factor price equalization directly. In
practice, factor quality is not observed and we allow it to vary in a com-
pletely general way across both regions and industries. Quality-adjusted
employments of factors of production will be related to their observed val-
ues as follows,
Prj = θPrjP˜rj , Nrj = θNrjN˜rj , Krj = θKrjK˜rj . (3)
where a tilde above a variable indicates that it is an observed value. Ob-
served factor prices will be related to quality-adjusted values according to,
w˜Prj = θPrjwPr , w˜Nrj = θNrjwNr , w˜Krj = θKrjwKr . (4)
2.3. Cost Minimization
Our tests for factor price equality are direct implications of firms’ cost
minimization (hence the property that they hold under both perfect and
imperfect competition). The cost function dual associated with the pro-
duction technology is,
Brj = A−1rj Γj(wPr , wNr , wKr )Yrj . (5)
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Demands for quality-adjusted factors of production may be obtained using
Shepherd’s Lemma,
Prj = A−1rj Yrj
∂Γj(·)
∂wPr
, Nrj = A−1rj Yrj
∂Γj(·)
∂wNr
, Krj = A−1rj Yrj
∂Γj(·)
∂wKr
. (6)
Dividing one first-order condition by another, we arrive at an expression for
relative demand for any two quality-adjusted factors of production. Thus,
for non-production (skilled) and production (unskilled) workers we have,
Nrj
Prj
=
∂Γj(·)/∂wNr
∂Γj(·)/∂wPr
. (7)
Using the relationship between quality-adjusted and observed values in (3),
this implies the following relative demand for observed factors of produc-
tion,
N˜rj
P˜rj
=
θPrj
θNrj
∂Γj(·)/∂wNr
∂Γj(·)/∂wPr
. (8)
2.4. Regional Factor Price Diﬀerences
In principle, the price of each quality-adjusted factor of production may
vary across regions. To capture this variation, we make use of the fact that
any factor price diﬀerence between a region r and another reference region
s can be decomposed into a component common to all factors of production
(λrs) and a factor-specific component (γzrs, z ∈ {P,N,K}). For example,
wNr = δNrswNs = λrsγNrswNs (9)
wPr = δPrswPs = λrsγPrswPs
wKr = δKrswKs = λrswKs
where, in the example above, we have normalized the common component
using capital price diﬀerences across regions (λrs = δKrs and γNrs = δNrs/δKrs).
Other normalizations are clearly possible and the analysis is invariant to
which is chosen.
Since it is hard to accurately measure the real user cost of capital at the
regional level, we focus in our empirical work on the absolute and relative
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wages of non-production and production workers. Under the null hypoth-
esis of factor price equalization, all factor prices are equalized. A rejection
of relative factor price equalization for any pair of factors will therefore be
suﬃcient for a rejection of the null hypothesis. In principle, the analysis
here may be undertaken for all combinations of factors of production.
2.5. Relative Factor Price Equalization (RFPE)
2.5.1. Null Hypothesis
Our most general test of factor price equalization is concerned with rela-
tive factor prices, and allows for both unobserved variation in factor quality
across region-industry pairs and neutral technology diﬀerences. The null
hypothesis of Relative Factor Price Equalization (RFPE) may be formal-
ized as:
(H0 : RFPE), γzrs = 1 ∀ z,
wNr
wPr
=
wNs
wPs
. (10)
The potential existence of unobserved factor quality diﬀerences across re-
gions within an industry (θNrj 6= θNsj and/or θPrj 6= θPsj in equation 4) means
that we cannot test this hypothesis directly using observed relative wages.
However, we show below that RFPE implies the equalization of observed
relative wage bills across regions and that this prediction is robust to un-
observed factor quality diﬀerences. Without loss of generality, we choose
region s as the reference region for measuring factor quality diﬀerences so
that,
θNsj = 1, θPsj = 1, ∀ j. (11)
Under the null hypothesis of RFPE, the values of observed relative wages
in the two regions are given by,
w˜Nr
w˜Pr
=
θNrj
θPrj
w˜Ns
w˜Ps
. (12)
Observed values of relative employment in the two regions may be obtained
using equation (8). Under RFPE, quality-adjusted factor prices diﬀer across
regions by a component λrs that is common across all factor prices. Homo-
geneity of degree 1 of the cost function implies that the derivatives ∂Γj/∂wzr
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are homogenous of degree 0 in factor prices. Thus,
∂Γj(wPr , wNr , wKr )
∂wzr
=
∂Γj(λrswPs , λrswNs , λrswKs )
∂(λrswzs)
=
∂Γj(wPs , wNs , wKs )
∂wzs
, ∀ z.
It follows immediately from equation (7) that, with identical quality-adjusted
relative factor prices, regions will employ quality-adjusted factors of pro-
duction in the same proportions. Using the relationship between observed
and quality-adjusted values, observed relative employment will vary across
regions in direct proportion to factor quality diﬀerences (from equation
(8)),
N˜rj
P˜rj
=
θPrj
θNrj
N˜sj
P˜sj
. (13)
Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed
relative employments, the terms in unobserved factor quality cancel. We
obtain the empirical prediction that, under the null hypothesis of RFPE,
the ratio of the observed wage bills (wbill) of non-production to production
workers is equalized across regions:
(H0 : RFPE),
]wbill
N
rj
]wbill
P
rj
=
]wbill
N
sj
]wbill
P
sj
. (14)
2.5.2. Alternative Hypothesis
The alternative hypothesis is that relative quality-adjusted wages vary
across regions. This variation is reflected in the factor-specific component
of factor price diﬀerences (γzrs):
(H1 : non-RFPE) γzrs 6= 1,
wNr
wPr
=
γNrs
γPrs
wNs
wPs
= γNPrs
wNs
wPs
. (15)
Observed values of relative wages in the two regions are thus,
w˜Nr
w˜Pr
= γNPrs
θNrj
θPrj
w˜Ns
w˜Ps
. (16)
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Observed values of relative employment in the two regions may again be
obtained from equation (8),
N˜rj
P˜rj
=
θPrj
θNrj
µ
∂Γj(·)/∂wNr
∂Γj(·)/∂wPr
¶µ
∂Γj(·)/∂wPs
∂Γj(·)/∂wNs
¶
N˜sj
P˜sj
. (17)
Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed
relative employments, the terms in unobserved factor quality again cancel.
The ratio of the observed wage bills of non-production to production work-
ers under the alternative of non-relative factor price equalization is thus:
]wbill
N
rj
]wbill
P
rj
= γNPrs
µ
∂Γj(·)/∂wNr
∂Γj(·)/∂wPr
¶µ
∂Γj(·)/∂wPs
∂Γj(·)/∂wNs
¶ ]wbillNsj
]wbill
P
sj
. (18)
(H1 : non-RFPE),
]wbill
N
rj
]wbill
P
rj
= ηNPrsj
]wbill
N
sj
]wbill
P
sj
. (19)
Appendix A shows that with a CES production technology, which is itself
a fairly flexible functional form, the expression in equation (18) simplifies
to,
]wbill
N
rj
]wbill
P
rj
=
¡
γNPrs
¢ρj/(ρj−1) ]wbillNsj
]wbill
P
sj
. (20)
Together equations (14) and (19) provide the basis for a test of the null
hypothesis of RFPE that is robust to unobserved region-industry variation
in factor quality. RFPE implies a testable parameter restriction in equation
(19), namely ηNPrsj = 1, which we exploit in our empirical work below.
Note that ηNPrsj 6= 1 is suﬃcient to reject RFPE, but not necessary. This
is seen most clearly from equation (20), where even if γNPrs 6= 1 (so that
quality-adjusted relative wages are not equalized), the parameter ηNPrsj =¡
γNPrs
¢ρj/(ρj−1) will still equal 1 for the special case of a Cobb-Douglas
production technology (ρj = 0). This is consistent with our empirical
approach. We test the null hypothesis ηNPrsj = 1 and, in so far as this
hypothesis is rejected, this is suﬃcient for us to reject RFPE. Indeed, the
fact that
¡
γNPrs
¢ρj/(ρj−1) is close to 1 for ρj close to 0 actually makes it
harder for us to reject the null hypothesis and strengthens any finding of a
rejection of RFPE.
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2.6. Absolute Factor Price Equalization (AFPE)
Also of potential interest is the question whether the absolute level of
factor prices is equalized across locations. In order to control for unobserved
factor quality, we once more make use of the result demonstrated above
that, multiplying observed wages by observed employment levels, terms in
factor quality cancel.
To test absolute factor price equalization (AFPE) we analyze variation
across regions in the share of total payments to a factor of production
in output. We demonstrate this for non-production workers; the analy-
sis for other factors of production is analogous. Observed employment of
non-production workers may be obtained from equations (6) and (3). Mul-
tiplying observed employment by observed wages and dividing by output,
we obtain,
w˜NrjN˜rj
Yrj
=
wNr Nrj
Yrj
= (θNrjwNr )
1
θNrj
A−1rj
∂Γj(·)
∂wNr
. (21)
Under the null hypothesis of AFPE, quality-adjusted wages are equalized
across regions (wNr = wNs ) and observed wages vary in direct proportion to
unobserved factor quality (w˜Nrj = θNrjwNs ), where we again choose region s as
a reference region so that θsj = 1 ∀j. The equalization of the absolute level
of factor prices requires identical production technologies across regions and
industries (Arj = Asj). Using this in equation (21), it follows that, under
the null hypothesis of AFPE, factor shares are equalized across regions:
(H0 : AFPE),
wNr Nrj
Yrj
=
wNs Nsj
Yrj
. (22)
Under the alternative hypothesis of non-AFPE, technical eﬃciency may
vary across region-industry pairs and regions may be characterized by dif-
ferent equilibrium factor prices. In this case, from equation (22), factor
shares in the two regions are related as follows:
(H1 : non-AFPE),
wNr Nrj
Yrj
= γNrs
µ
Asj
Arj
¶µ
∂Γj(·)/∂wNr
∂Γj(·)/∂wNs
¶µ
wNs Nsj
Ysj
¶
.
(23)
Together, equations (22) and (23) provide the basis for a test of the null
hypothesis of AFPE, with AFPE implying a testable parameter restriction
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in equation (23). In the rest of the paper, we focus on the test for relative
factor price equalization derived above.
2.7. Diagrammatic Representation of Producer Equilibrium
To provide some further economic intuition for the tests, this section
complements the formal analysis above with a graphical representation of
producer equilibrium using a Lerner (1952) diagram. There are two re-
gions A and B, each of which is endowed with skilled labour (N) and
unskilled labour (P ) in quantities indicated by the endowment points EA
and EB. Figure 1 considers an example with three goods: skilled labour-
intensive Computers, unskilled labour-intensive Textiles, and intermediate
skill-intensity Machinery. The production technology is characterized by
the unit value isoquants for the three sectors and, for simplicity and with-
out loss of generality, the figures are drawn for the case of Leontief or fixed
unit input requirement technologies. The analysis is directly analogous for
technologies with unit input requirements that vary with relative factor
prices.
Even if the regions face common commodity prices and have identical
technologies, suﬃciently large diﬀerences in endowments will induce them
to specialize in diﬀerent mixes of goods with diﬀerent equilibrium relative
factor prices. The skilled abundant region (A) produces skilled-labour in-
tensive Computers and Machinery, while the unskilled abundant region (B)
specializes in Machinery and unskilled-intensive Textiles. Each region lies
within a diﬀerent cone of diversification, where the word ‘cone’ refers to the
set of endowment vectors that select the same s et of go o ds pro duced.
The relative wage of skilled workers is lower in the skilled labour abun-
dant region so that, as one looks across regions in diﬀerent cones of di-
versification, the relative wage of skilled workers falls with their relative
factor abundance. Production structure overlaps in the good with interme-
diate factor intensity (Machinery). And, with technologies characterized
by variable unit input requirements (not shown in the figure), this over-
lapping good will be produced using diﬀerent factor intensities in the two
regions.
Other potential explanations for violations of relative factor price equal-
ization include non-neutral technology diﬀerences across regions, regional
variation in goods prices due to transport costs that diﬀer systematically
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across industries, increasing returns to scale, as well as non-traded goods
and variation in the amenities provided by diﬀerent regions. All of these
explanations are encompassed by the theoretical framework of the previous
section and can be shown diagrammatically using analogues of Figure 1. We
return to consider these explanations in detail in the empirical discussion
below.
3. Data Description
Our data source is the United Kingdom’s Annual Respondents Database
(ARD). Basic information on the population of establishments in the pro-
duction sector is available during 1980-98, including employment, location,
ownership, and industry. More detailed information is available for a sample
of these establishments, including output, investment, intermediate inputs,
employment, and wages.1 This sample includes around 13000 establish-
ments per year, and is comprised of the population of establishments with
100 or more employees together with a sample of smaller establishments.2
As our methodology requires information on wages and employment, we
work with the sampled data. In the robustness section, we demonstrate
that the results are not driven by any resulting sample selection bias.
In the empirical analysis, we focus on the manufacturing sector for
which data are available. Under the null hypothesis of RFPE, relative
wage bills should be equalized in all sectors of the economy. A rejection
of the null hypothesis for manufacturing is thus suﬃcient for a violation of
RFPE. For skilled workers we use data on Administrative, Technical, and
1ARD establishments correspond roughly to a ‘line of business’. Establishments are
potentially more disaggregate than firms, i.e. some firms are single establishments while
others consist of several establishments. Establishments are more aggregate than plants,
i.e. some establishments consist of a single plant, while others include several. As a
result, an establishment’s plants may be located in more than one region. Such overlap
reduces spatial variation in wages, employment, and wage bills in our data, making it
more diﬃcult to reject the null hypothesis of RFPE. As a check on the empirical results,
we p erform s everal robustness te sts in se ctio n 5 .2.
2For the years that we consider (1992 and 1986), the sampling threshold is 100 employ-
ees. The ARD only contains information on production activity. Other non-production
activities such as headquarter services and research and development (R&D) are ex-
cluded. For further discussion of the ARD data, see Devereux et al. (1999), Disney et
al. (2000), Duranton and Overman (2002), and Griﬃth (1999).
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Clerical Workers (non-production workers), and for unskilled workers we
use information on Operatives (production workers). These are widely-used
measures of skills in the existing trade and labour market literatures (see
for example Berman et al. 1998 and Lawrence and Slaughter 1993) and the
only measures available in the ARD data. The existing literature typically
finds a high correlation between these occupation-based measures of skills
and those based on educational attainment (see in particular Machin and
Van Reenen 1998). Furthermore, a key advantage of our methodology is
that it explicitly controls for any unobserved variation in the quality of
non-production and production workers across both regions and industries.
The United Kingdom’s Labour Force Survey (LFS) does report some
information on the wages and employment by region according to an edu-
cational attainment-based definition of skills. A central advantage of the
ARD over this alternative data source is the detailed level of industrial dis-
aggregation. The LFS reports information only for 2 and 3-digit industries
compared with 4-digit industries in the ARD. Furthermore, because the
LFS is survey-based, cell sizes for even 2 and 3-digit industries in the highly
disaggregated geographical regions considered here may be very small.3
The ARD yields consistent information on the wages and employment of
skilled and unskilled workers across regions of the United Kingdom within
highly disaggregated industries.
These aspects of the data are important because our empirical approach
focuses on variation in relative wages within industries. One potential ex-
planation for relative wage diﬀerences across regions within an industry is
that the analysis is undertaken at too high a level of aggregation. The
composition of an industry may vary across regions (for example, a 2-digit
sector may consist of diﬀerent 4-digit sub-sectors across regions). In general,
tests of relative factor price equality should employ the most disaggregate
industry data available.
We examine spatial variation in relative wages, employment, and wage
bill levels at two levels of geographical disaggregation. First, we consider
10 Administrative Regions of the United Kingdom.4 This enables us to
3An additional problem with the LFS is that the information is reported on a place
of residence rather than place of work basis.
4Northern Ireland is excluded from the analysis because the data are collected sepa-
rately and there is only one Pos tco de A rea for the whole o f N orth ern Ireland.
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analyze the broad pattern of spatial variation and allows the results of
our methodology to be compared with existing studies which have focused
on Administrative Regions. Second, we examine variation across the 100+
Postcode Areas listed in Table 1. These regions are based around towns and
correspond approximately to commuting patterns and local labour market
areas. Examples include Aberdeen, Birmingham, and Manchester. We
aggregate the 8 postcode areas in Central London to form a single geo-
graphical region, as is consistent with commuting patterns. These data
provide a rich source of information on spatial variation in factor prices
within the United Kingdom, and enable us to examine whether factor price
variation is greater within or across Administrative Regions.
Information on Postcode Areas is only available in the ARD from 1985
onwards; separate data on non-production and production workers ceases
to be collected after 1995; and there is a change in the United Kingdom’s
Industrial Classification after 1992. In our main specification, we examine
spatial variation in relative wages, employment, and wage bills for 1992. As
a robustness test, we also report results for 1986. To the extent that we find
persistent diﬀerences in quality-adjusted relative wages across UK regions
for years that are at such diﬀerent stages of the UK business cycle, we
have evidence of systematic departures from RFPE that are not driven by
idiosyncratic shocks to regions or business cycle fluctuations. In practice it
may take time for firms to adjust some factors of production such as physical
capital, and analyzing two separate points in time also provides evidence
that the results are not driven by out of equilibrium physical capital stocks
in any one year.
Establishments themselves will be subject to idiosyncratic shocks and
there is likely to be measurement error in establishment-level data that may
be large in any one year. Therefore, in our empirical analysis we aggre-
gate establishments in each region to the level of approximately 200 4-digit
manufacturing industries. We exclude all industries classified as ‘other
manufacturing’ since these are heterogeneous categories and may include
diﬀerent sub-industries in diﬀerent regions. The null hypothesis of RFPE
predicts the equalization of relative wage bills across regions within each
4-digit industry. This yields approximately 1400 region-industry observa-
tions for Administrative Regions and over 5000 region-industry observations
for Postcode Areas.
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4. Econometric Specification
In Section 2, we showed that, under the null of RFPE, the ratio of the
non-production workers’ wage bill to the production workers’ wage bill will
be the same across regions within an industry. This implies that, for an
industry j, each region’s relative wage bill should equal the value for the
United Kingdom as a whole,
]wbill
N
rj
]wbill
P
rj
=
]wbill
N
sj
]wbill
P
sj
=
]wbill
N
UKj
]wbill
P
UKj
(24)
The simplest test of the null hypothesis is therefore to regress the ratio of
wage bills for region r relative to the ratio for the UK as a whole on set of
region dummies,
ln
Ã
RWBNPrj
RWBNPUKj
!
=
X
r
αNPr dr + εNPrj (25)
where RWBNPrj denotes the relative wage bill in industry j and region r for
non-production workers and production workers (RWBNPrj = wage billNrj /
wage billPrj); RWBNPUKj is the corresponding relative wage bill for the UK
as a whole; and the αNPr correspond to the coeﬃcients on the regional
dummies dr. When defining the relative wage bill for the UK as a whole,
we exclude the own region r. Under the null hypothesis of RFPE, αNPr = 0
for all regions and factor pairs, and a test of whether the αNPr are jointly
equal to zero therefore provides a test of RFPE.
The regression in e quation ( 25) corresp onds to diﬀerences i n means
test. We choose the UK as a whole as a base region and test RFPE by
comparing the relative wage bill for an industry j across all regions r to
the value for the UK as a whole in the same industry. We also test RFPE
by estimating equation (19) for all industry and region-pair combinations.
That is, we begin by choosing a region s to be the base (γNPs = 1) and run
an analogous regression to equation (25),
ln
Ã
RWBNPrj
RWBNPsj
!
=
X
r
αNPrs dr + εNPrsj (26)
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A test of whether the αNPrs are jointly equal to zero provides a test of the
null hypothesis of RFPE. Rejecting αNPrs = 0 is suﬃcient to reject the null
hypothesis of RFPE, and any pair of regions r and r0 face the same relative
factor prices if αNPrs = αNPr0s . Equation (26) is then estimated for all possible
choices of base region s.
Although regions have the same relative wage bills under the null hy-
pothesis of RFPE (hence αNPrs = 0), the theoretical analysis of Section 2
suggests that, under the alternative hypothesis, the coeﬃcient on the re-
gional dummies (ηNPrs in equation 19 and αNPrs in equations 25 and 26) may
vary across industries. With a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) pro-
duction technology, this cross-industry variation is associated with diﬀerent
elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers (equation
20).
We have no strong priors on how the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent types of labour (ρj) or other features of the operator Γj in the cost
function (Brj) vary across industries, and therefore we pool observations
across industries. Since under the null hypothesis αNPrsj = 0 for all industries
j, a finding of statistically significant coeﬃcients on the regional dummies
when pooling observations is suﬃcient to reject RFPE.
Under the assumption of a CES production technology and choosing
a value for the elasticity of substitution σ and hence ρ = 1 − 1/σ, the
estimated coeﬃcients on the regional dummies may be used to derive im-
plied quality-adjusted relative wage diﬀerences across regions (equation 20).
Comparing these estimates of quality-adjusted wage diﬀerences with actual
values for relative wages, we can also derive implied diﬀerences in the rel-
ative quality of skilled and unskilled workers across regions and industries
(θNrj/θPrj in equation 16).
For a given value of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers, we are thus able to obtain estimates of the extent to
which actual relative wage diﬀerences across regions correspond to true
diﬀerences in quality-adjusted relative wages or are instead explained by
unobserved variation in factor quality.
Note that equations (25) and (26) compare the relative wage bill for
non-production and production workers in region r to the value in a base
region within each industry j. This is a ‘diﬀerence in diﬀerences’ speci-
fication with a number of attractive statistical properties. Any industry-
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specific determinant of relative wage bills that is common across regions is
‘diﬀerenced-out’ when we normalize relative to the base region on the left-
hand side of the equations (for example, features of the production technol-
ogy, compensating diﬀerentials across industries, other inter-industry wage
diﬀerentials, and industry-specific labour market institutions such as the
degree of unionization). The analysis thus explicitly controls for observed
and unobserved heterogeneity in the determinants of relative wage bills
across industries.
Similarly, in both region r and the base region we analyze the wage
bill of non-production workers relative to production workers. Therefore,
any region-specific determinant of wage bills that is common to both non-
production and production workers is ‘diﬀerenced-out’ when we construct
a region’s relative wage bill (RWBNPrj = wage billNrj / wage billPrj). Here
potential examples include neutral regional technology diﬀerences and com-
pensating diﬀerentials across regions.
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Baseline Specification
We begin by presenting the estimation results using the UK as a whole
as the base region. We first report the results for Administrative Regions,
followed by those for Postcode Areas. Table 2 reports the estimated dif-
ferences in log relative wage bill ratios for Administrative Regions in 1992
and 1986. In 1992 at the 5% significance level, we find one rejection above
zero (for the South-East of England) and 5 rejections below zero (for the
East Midlands, Yorkshire & Humberside, Northern, Wales, and Scotland).
The results for 1986 display a similar pattern. At the 5% significance level,
we again find a rejection above zero for the South-East of England, and
there are again 5 rejections below zero, with the West Midlands replacing
the East Midlands.
Whether a positive estimated value of the dummies corresponds to a
higher or lower quality-adjusted relative wage of skilled workers depends on
the operator Γj in the cost function (equation 18). With a CES production
technology, a positive coeﬃcient corresponds to a lower quality-adjusted
relative skilled wage under a CES production technology if 0 < ρ < 1 (see
equation 20). These values of ρ imply an elasticity of substitution between
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skilled and unskilled workers greater than unity (i.e. σ > 1), which is
consistent with typical empirical estimates in the labour literature (see in
particular Katz and Autor 1999 and Katz and Murphy 1992).
Table 3 reports implied quality-adjusted relative skilled wages for σ = 2.
We find that the skilled-abundant region (here the South-East) is charac-
terized by a lower equilibrium value of the relative wage of skilled workers.
The actual wage of non-production workers relative to production work-
ers in the South-East was 97% of the UK value in 1992 and 99% in 1986.
In both years, this is higher than the estimated quality-adjusted relative
wage for σ = 2. This therefore suggests that the relative quality of non-
production workers in the South-East is higher than in the UK as a whole,
as is consistent with economic priors.
Results for Postcode Areas in 1992 and 1986 are presented in Tables
4 and 5. As indicated in the tables, 32 of 111 regions reject factor price
equality at the 10% level in 1992. Of these, 9 reject above zero and 23 reject
below zero. Table 4 reports the estimated dummies for those Postcode
Areas that reject above zero. These are concentrated exclusively in the
South-East of England close to the M25, M4 corridor, and the area around
Cambridge; they include Cambridge, St. Albans, Reading, and Slough (see
Figure 3).
Results for 1986 display a similar pattern: 34 regions reject factor price
equality at the 10% level of significance, with 7 rejecting above zero and
27 rejecting below zero. Four of the rejections above zero are the same
Postcode Areas as in 1992: Hemel Hempstead, Reading, Slough, and Sut-
ton. The emergence of Cambridge and St. Albans as high relative wage
bill regions is specific to 1992 and is consistent with the recent development
of a cluster of skill intensive information technology and biotechnology in-
dustries in this area.
Tables 4 and 5 also report implied quality adjusted relative wages for
σ = 2. Figures 2 and 3 display the geographical distribution of the esti-
mated coeﬃcients for Administrative Regions and Postcode Areas respec-
tively in 1992. The figures separate three groups of regions - those with
positive and statistically estimated values of the dummies (indicated by the
dark shading); those with negative and statistically significant estimated
values of the dummies (corresponding to the intermediate shading); and
those with statistically insignificant estimated values of the dummies (light
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or no shading). Both figures show a clear concentration of regions with
positive estimated values of the dummies in the South-East of England,
where, for σ > 1, the (quality-adjusted) skill premium is relatively low.
We also allow each Administrative Region and each Postcode Area to
serve as the base and then run the bilateral regression specified in equation
(23). Given the large number of coeﬃcients the bilateral regressions gen-
erate, we report a summary of rejections by region definition in Table 6.5
For all choices of the base, for both Administrative Regions and Postcode
Areas, and in both 1992 and 1986, the null hypothesis that the estimated
coeﬃcients on the regional dummies are equal to zero is easily rejected at
the 1% level with a F-test. For Postcode Areas in 1992, 17% of the region-
pairs reject relative factor price equality at the 10% level, while 11% reject
at the 5% level. Every region rejects with at least 6 other regions. In
1986, 19% of the region pairs reject relative factor price equality at the
10% level, and 12% reject at the 5% level. Every region rejects with at
least 5 other regions at the 10% level. For Administrative Regions, we
find that 57% of region-pairs reject at the 10% level in 1992 and 40% in
1986. This corresponds to an average number of rejections against 5 and
4 Administrative Regions respectively, making clear that the rejection of
RFPE is not simply driven by the South-East of England. Every region
rejects with at least 2 other regions at the 10% level in both years.
Taken together, the UK base and the bilateral regression results em-
phatically reject the null hypothesis of relative factor price equality in the
UK.
5.2. Robustness
These results are robust across a variety of econometric specifications
and to a number of dataset refinements, reported in Table 7. To conserve
space, we highlight robustness with respect to the 1992 Administrative
Region results. However, similar checks for 1986 Administrative Regions
and for Postcode Areas display the same robustness.
The first column of Table 7 reports the baseline results for factor price
equality across Administrative Regions in 1992. The baseline sample for
5Overall, there are 90 and 12,210 possible bilateral rejections for Administrative Re-
gions and Postcode Areas respectively. Any single base region can reject up to 9 or 110
other regions for Administrative Regions and Postcode Areas, respectively.
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these results includes all establishments, some of which may report on
plants in more than one Administrative Region or Postcode Area. We
therefore undertake the following two robustness tests. First, in column
(2) we report coeﬃcient estimates for the sub-sample of single plant estab-
lishments where overlap does not occur and where we find a very similar
pattern of results. Second, in column (3), we allocate establishment-level
data to plants on the basis of their shares of establishment employment. All
plants associated with an establishment are given the same relative wages
and relative wage bills. This robustness test introduces a bias against
rejecting RFPE. However, even with this bias, we continue to find a re-
jection, with the South-East coeﬃcient positive and statistically significant
and the Northern, Wales, and Scotland coeﬃcients negative and statisti-
cally significant.
The baseline sample includes the population of establishments with
more than 100 employees and a sample of establishments with fewer than
100 employees. In order to ensure that our results are not being driven by
the presence of a non-random sample of smaller establishments, column (4)
also reports results separately for the population of establishments with
more than 100 employees. Finally, our coeﬃcient estimates are means
across all 4-digit industries in each region. Although each region has a large
number of establishments across all industries, some individual industries
within a region may contain few establishments. Since measurement error
at the establishment level is a potential concern, column (5) also reports
estimation results dropping all 4-digit region-industries that contain fewer
than 5 establishments. Once again RFPE is rejected and we find a similar
pattern of estimated coeﬃcients.
The rejection of relative factor price equality in the UK is an extremely
robust empirical finding. In the next Section we explore a number of
potential explanations for these results.
6. Explanations
6.1. Multiple Heckscher-Ohlin Cones
The existence of multiple Heckscher-Ohlin cones of diversification within
the UK provides a potential true rejection of relative factor price equality.
This rejection is based on the i mmobility of at l east one f actor, which prevent s
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regional factor prices (and endowments) from converging towards a common
value across the country.6 As noted above, a central prediction of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model is that the skill premium is inversely proportional
to regional skill endowments across cones (see for example Leamer 1995).
Graphically, this relationship is apparent in Figure 1, where the slope of
the isocost line anchoring unit value isoquants is steeper in the relatively
skill abundant cone.
Our estimates of quality-adjusted relative wages in Table 3 exhibit just
such a violation of factor price equality: for reasonable estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between production and non-production workers,
we find the skill premium to be lower in the regions around London, where
skilled labour is relatively abundant, and higher in outlying areas, where
skilled labour is relatively scarce.
The potential existence of multiple cones of diversification within the
UK is quite important for formulating public policy, in that it implies asym-
metric sensitivity of regions to external shocks. A decline in the price of
unskilled labour intensive products on world markets (associated with de-
creases in tariﬀs and transport costs, or economic growth of labour abun-
dant economics like China) aﬀects workers diﬀerently depending upon their
region. Such price declines drive down the return to unskilled workers in
low-skill regions while unskilled workers in high-skill regions benefit unam-
biguously from cheaper imports.
A key empirical prediction of multiple Heckscher-Ohlin cones is that
regions will exhibit systematic diﬀerences in production structure, with
skilled abundant regions producing a set of goods that is more skilled in-
tensive than that in unskilled abundant regions.
6.2. Region-Industry Productivity Diﬀerences, Transport Costs and In-
creasing Returns
Region-industry variation in total factor productivity (TFP) can also
lead to a true rejection of relative factor price equality. If technology is
not common across regions and varies diﬀerentially across industries, rela-
tive factor prices will vary so long as workers cannot re-locate to arbitrage
6Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) and Hugues and McCormick (1994) provide empir-
ical evidence on limited labour mobility within the United Kingdom.
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away wage diﬀerences. Thus, this explanation, though having a diﬀerent
cause than the multiple cone Heckscher-Ohlin explanation, nevertheless re-
lies upon a similar assumption of factor immobility.
To explain our empirical finding of a lower quality-adjusted skill pre-
mium in relatively skill abundant regions, it would have to be the case that
technical eﬃciency is systematically relatively higher in low-skill intensive
industries within high-skill abundant regions. This is because an increase
in technical eﬃciency of low-skill industries acts like an increase in the rel-
ative price of the low-skill goods. Within the simple two factor, two good
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, this increase in the price of the low-skill good
reduces the quality-adjusted skill premium (via a clockwise rotation of the
isocost line), inducing a switch toward more skill intensive techniques in
both sectors.
Though this explanation yields an additional empirical prediction, it
seems implausible that technical eﬃciency is higher in skill scarce industries
within skill abundant regions. If anything, considerations of knowledge
spillovers and external economies of scale appear to suggest that technical
eﬃciency is higher in skill intensive industries disproportionately located in
skilled abundant regions.
A conceptually similar violation of relative factor price equality is possi-
ble via industry-region variation in transport costs. Indeed, lower transport
costs for low-skill industries within skill-abundant regions can lead to the
pattern of relative wages observed above.
Geography can also play a role in a true rejection of relative factor
price equality via the existence of increasing returns to scale (see Appendix
A). To match the skill premia we observe, increasing returns to scale can
be either internal or external, but must reduce relative (average) costs of
production of low-skill industries in high-skill regions. This region variation
in scale economies raises the relative demand for low-skill workers (in the
skill-abundant regions) and reduces the skill premium. Here, too, however,
we find the existence of this pattern of increasing returns to be implausible.
This hypothesis is testable empirically, either indirectly using measured
TFP or directly by examining the relative wages of skilled workers and the
scale of production in a region.
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6.3. Spatial Variation in Nominal But Not Real Wages
Relative wage bills can vary systematically across regions even with per-
fect labour mobility. If real consumption wages are equal in each region for
both types of workers, then workers have no incentive to relocate. Nom-
inal wages may still vary due to diﬀerences in the regional cost of living
associated with non-traded goods or variation in amenities. For relative
wage bills to diﬀer, the cost of living must vary diﬀerentially for skilled and
unskilled workers across regions. In particular, to explain our finding of
a lower relative skilled wage in the South-East, the relative cost of living
must be lower there for skilled workers.
This hypothesis also involves a true rejection of RFPE. It implies dif-
ferential variation in the cost of living for skilled and unskilled workers and
empirically testable. The hypothesis predicts the same variation in produc-
tion structure as in the multiple cone Heckscher-Ohlin model. Industries
that are intensive in skilled workers should locate in the region with the
lower nominal relative wage for skilled workers, as firms care only about
their production costs and not the consumption wage of diﬀerent types of
workers.
6.4. Heterogeneous products
The existence of heterogeneous products within industries can lead to
a spurious rejection of RFPE. Suppose that relative factor prices are equal
across all regions, but there are products with diﬀerent skill requirements
within each industry. If a region systematically produces products that are
intensive in skilled labour (in every industry) then its relative wage bill will
be larger than the average for the country even without diﬀerences in rela-
tive (or absolute) factor prices. Thus product heterogeneity can generate
a rejection of RFPE but it has to exhibit a particular systematic pattern.
Our analysis, by examining wage variation at the four-digit industry level,
is a substantial improvement over existing inter- and intra-national studies
based upon a coarser aggregation of products and exploits the most dis-
aggregated data currently available data. Furthermore, when restricting
the sample to establishments with similar characteristics (e.g. single ver-
sus multi-plant or small versus large establishments), we continue to find a
similar pattern of results.
Factor Price Equalization in the UK? 24
6.5. Misclassified workers
Finally, we note that while our analysis can account for unobserved dif-
ferences in the quality of non-production and production workers within
region-industry pairs, it is susceptible to systematic errors in assigning
workers to these job categories. Random misclassification across industry-
region pairs and systematic misreporting within an industry is accounted for
in our methodology. However, systematic misclassification across regions
(e.g. all industries in region r report non-production workers as produc-
tion workers) can induce spurious rejection of relative factor price equality.
While job misclassification may occur, we think it unlikely that all indus-
tries in a region will systematically misclassify workers in the same way.
7. Conclusions
We examine the extent of relative wage variation across geographic areas
of the United Kingdom using a methodology that is robust to unobserved
region-industry diﬀerences in factor quality, variations in production func-
tions across industries and Hicks-neutral regional technology diﬀerences.
Despite the United Kingdom being a small, densely-populated country
with highly integrated goods markets and the potential for factor mobil-
ity, there is strong evidence against absolute and relative wage equality.
We find statistically significant and quantitatively important diﬀerences in
quality-adjusted absolute and relative wages across both broadly defined
Administrative Regions as well as more narrowly defined Postcode Areas.
We find that skill abundant regions in the South-East have a lower skill
premium than skill scarce regions for plausible values of the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, We examine a number
of potential explanations for this finding and highlight additional, empir-
ically verifiable implications of each. Multiple Heckscher-Ohlin cones of
diversification and spatial variation in workers’ relative cost of living pro-
vide natural explanations for the observed variation in skill premia and have
the same implications for production structure across regions of the UK.
Other explanations based on TFP diﬀerences, increasing returns to scale,
and transport costs require implausible assumptions to be made. More for-
mal testing of the relative importance of each explanation is an interesting
area for further research but lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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Taken together, our findings suggest that variation in relative factor
prices plays an important role in shaping firms’ location decisions within
the UK. The results contribute to our understanding of regional variation
in economic outcomes within the UK, an issue of increasing policy-interest
in the context of the ongoing process of political devolution.
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A Appendix A
A1. Imperfect Competition
This section discusses in more detail the case of imperfect competition.
Each of the tests of absolute and relative factor price equality is robust
to allowing firms to choose prices subject to a downward sloping demand
curve under conditions of imperfect competition. All the tests require is
that firms minimize costs. To see this, note that firms’ profit maximization
problem (1) may be re-written as follows,
max
Yrj
πrj = vrj(Yrj)Yrj −A−1rj Γj(w
P
r , wNr , wKr )Yrj . (27)
where Brj = A−1rj Γj(wPr , wNr , wKr )Yrj is the total cost function. The first-
order condition for profit-maximization is,
dvrj(Yrj)
dYrj
Yrj + vrj(Yrj)−
Γj(·)
Arj
= 0. (28)
assuming that the demand function vrj(Yrj) is invertible and noting that
the elasticity of demand is εrj(Yrj) ≡ −(dYrj/dvrj)vrj/Yrj , we obtain the
standard result that equilibrium price is a constant mark-up over marginal
cost,
vrj(Yrj) =
µ
εrj(Yrj)
εrj(Yrj)− 1
¶
Γj(·)
Arj
. (29)
By Shepherd’s Lemma, equilibrium demand for each quality-adjusted fac-
tor of production continues to be given by the derivative of the total cost
function with respect to the price of a factor of production as specified in
equation (6). Our tests for b oth relative and absolute factor price equal-
ization may be derived in exactly the  same way as in the main text.
A2. External Economies of Scale
It is straightforward to introduce external economies of scale into the
framework above in either perfectly or imperfectly competitive market
structures. External economies of scale correspond to the assumption that
technical eﬃciency in a region-industry is a function of scale. In the most
general case, we have,
Arj = Arj(Yrj , Yr,−j , Y−r,j , Y−r,−j) (30)
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where Yr,−j is the vector of outputs in all other industries in a region, Y−r,j
is the vector of all other regions outputs in the industry, and Y−r,−j is the
vector of all other regions outputs in all other industries.
External economies of scale provide an explanation for variation in tech-
nical eﬃciency across countries and industries. In order for all production
in an industry not to concentrate in a single region, we require either that
external economies of scale operate across regions or there to be transport
costs. The derivation of the tests for both relative and absolute factor price
equality remains exactly as in the main text. The region-industry varia-
tion in technical eﬃciency induced by external economies of scale supplies
a potential explanation for violations of absolute and relative factor price
equality as discussed in the main text.
A3. Internal Economies of Scale
Internal economies must clearly be combined with imperfect competi-
tion and modify the discussion above in so far as the cost function is no
longer linearly homogenous of degree 1 in output. An individual firm i’s
profit maximization problem takes the form,
max
Yi
vi(Yi)Yi −A−1rj Γj(w
P
r , wNr , wKr , Yi) (31)
where Bi = A−1rj Γj(wPr , wNr , wKr , Yi) is the total cost function. The firm’s
equilibrium price continues to be a constant mark-up over marginal cost,
vi(Yi) =
µ
εi(Yi)
εi(Yi)− 1
¶
1
Arj
∂Γj(wPr , wNr , wKr , Yi)
∂Yi
(32)
Equilibrium demands for quality-adjusted factors of production may again
be obtained using Shepherd’s Lemma. Using the relationship between
quality-adjusted and non-quality adjusted values, a firm’s relative demand
for observed production and non-production workers will be given by,
N˜i
P˜i
=
θPrj
θNrj
∂Γj(wPr , wNr , wKr , Yi)/∂wNr
∂Γj(wPr , wNr , wKr , Yi)/∂wPr
(33)
Multiplying the expressions for observed relative factor prices and observed
relative employments, the terms in unobserved factor quality will again
cancel. The expression for relative wage bills now becomes,
Factor Price Equalization in the UK? 32
]wbill
N
irj
]wbill
P
irj
= γNPrs
µ
∂Γj(·)/∂wNr
∂Γj(·)/∂wPr
¶µ
∂Γj(·)/∂wPs
∂Γj(·)/∂wNs
¶ ]wbillNhsj
]wbill
P
hsj
(34)
In the standard benchmark case in the theoretical literature on trade under
internal economies of scale, firms within an industry face the same constant
elasticity of substitution εj , cost functions are identical and homothetic
within industries, and there is free entry so that price equals average cost.
Combining free entry with the pricing relationship in (32), the equilibrium
ratio of average to marginal cost will equal a constant εj/(εj − 1), which
with homothetic cost functions defines a unique equilibrium value of output
for all firms in the industry Yi = Y j .
Under the null hypothesis of factor price equalization, γNPrs = 1 and
with all firms in the industry facing the same factor prices and producing
the same output the terms in parentheses in (34) will cancel, so that we
again obtain the prediction that relative wage bills are equalized under the
null.
More generally in the presence of internal economies of scale, variation
in firm size across regions and industries provides an additional explanation
for violations of relative and absolute factor price equality. For the relative
price of skilled workers to be lower in skilled abundant regions, we require
firm size to be relatively larger in unskilled intensive industries in skilled
abundant regions.
A4. CES Technology
In this section of the appendix, we consider the special case of a CES
production technology. In this case, relative wage bill ratios under the
alternative of non-RFPE depend only on relative quality-adjusted wages
and the elasticity of substitution between factors of production. In the
empirical analysis, this enables us to extract from the estimated coeﬃcients
implied diﬀerences in quality-adjusted wages across regions.
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A4.1. Profit Maximization
With a CES production technology, it proves tractable to work directly
with the firm’s profit maximization problem,
maxP,N,K Πrj = vrjArj
h
aPj P
ρj
rj + aNj N
ρj
rj + aKj K
ρj
rj
i 1
ρj
−wPr Prj − wNr Nrj − wKr Krj
(35)
where for simplicity we consider the case where firms are price-takers in
product markets. The first-order conditions to this maximization problem
are,
wPr = vrjArjρjaPj P
ρj−1
rj Y
1−ρj
rj (36)
wNr = vrjArjρjaNj N
ρj−1
rj Y
1−ρj
rj (37)
wKr = vrjArjρjaNj K
ρj−1
rj Y
1−ρj
rj (38)
where Prj = θPrjP˜rj , Nrj = θNrjN˜rj , and Krj = θKrjK˜rj . From the first-order
conditions, observed (non quality-adjusted) relative employment levels of
non-production and production workers must satisfy,
N˜rj
P˜rj
=
θPrj
θNrj
Ã
aNj
aPj
!1/(1−ρj)µwNr
wPr
¶−1/(1−ρj)
(39)
A4.2. Null Hypothesis
Under the null hypothesis of RFPE, we again obtain the prediction that
the ratio of the observed wage bills of non-production to production workers
is equalized across regions (this follows immediately from combining equa-
tion 12 with equation 39, noting that under RFPE wNr /wPr = wNs /wPs ):
(H0 : RFPE),
]wbill
N
rj
]wbill
P
rj
=
]wbill
N
sj
]wbill
P
sj
(40)
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A4.3. Alternative Hypothesis
Under the alternative hypothesis of non-RFPE, the observed (non-
quality adjusted) relative wages of non-production and production workers
in regions r and s are again related according to,
w˜Nr
w˜Pr
= γNPrs
θNrj
θPrj
w˜Ns
w˜Ps
(41)
Using equation (15) with equation (39), relative employment levels in re-
gions r and s under the alternative of non-RFPE are given by,
N˜rj
P˜rj
=
¡
γNPrs
¢1/(ρj−1) θPrj
θNrj
N˜sj
P˜sj
, (42)
Combining equations (41) and (42), we obtain the following prediction for
the ratio of the observed wage bills of non-production to production work-
ers:
(H1 : non-RFPE)
]wbill
N
rj
]wbill
P
rj
=
¡
γNPrs
¢ρj/(ρj−1) ]wbillNsj
]wbill
P
sj
(43)
Given estimates of
¡
γNPrs
¢ρj/(ρj−1) for r, s, if one makes an assumption
about the elasticity of substitution between non-production and production
workers (σj = 1/(1 − ρj)), one can evaluate the relative wage diﬀerences
across regions implied by the estimates.
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Postcode Post Town Postcode Post Town Postcode Post Town Postcode Post Town
AB Aberdeen E London (East) LE Leicester SK Stockport
AL St Albans EC London (East Central) LL Llandudno SL Slough
B Birmingham EH Edinburgh LN Lincoln SM Sutton
BA Bath EN Enfield LS Leeds SN Swindon
BB Blackburn EX Exeter LU Luton SO Southampton
BD Bradford FK Falkirk M Manchester SP Salisbury
BH Bournemouth FY Fylde (Blackpool) ME Medway (Rochester) SR Sunderland
BL Bolton G Glasgow MK Milton Keynes SS Southend on Sea
BN Brighton GL Gloucester ML Motherwell ST Stoke on Trent
BR Bromley GU Guildford N London (North) SW London (South West)
BS Bristol GY Guernsey & Alderney NE Newcastle on Tyne SY Shrewsbury
BT Belfast HA Harrow NG Nottingham TA Taunton
CA Carlisle HD Huddersfield NN Northampton TD Tweed (Galashiels)
CB Cambridge HG Harrogate NP Newport TF Telford
CF Cardiff HP Hemel Hempstead NR Norwich TN Tunbridge Wells
CH Chester HR Hereford NW London (North West) TQ Torquay
CM Chelmsford HS Western Isles (Harris) OL Oldham TR Truro
CO Colchester HU Hull OX Oxford TS Teesside (Middlesbrough)
CR Croydon HX Halifax PA Paisley TW Twickenham
CT Canterbury IG Ilford PE Peterborough UB Uxbridge
CV Coventry IM Isle of Man PH Perth W London (West)
CW Crewe IP Ipswich PL Plymouth WA Warrington
DA Dartford IV Inverness PO Portsmouth WC London (West Central)
DD Dundee JE Jersey PR Preston WD Watford
DE Derby KA Kilmarnock RG Reading WF Wakefield
DG Dumfries & Galloway KT Kingston upon Thames RH Redhill WN Wigan
DH Durham KW Orkney Isles (Kirkwall) RM Romford WR Worcester
DL Darlington KY Kirkcaldy S Sheffield WS Walsall
DN Doncaster L Liverpool SA Swansea WV Wolverhampton
DT Dorchester LA Lancaster SE London (South East) YO York
DY Dudley LD Llandrindod Wells SG Stevenage ZE Shetland Isles (Lerwick)
Table 1: Postcode Regions in the UK
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Administrative 
Region Coeff p-value
Administrative 
Region Coeff p-value
South-East 0.263 0.000 South-East 0.226 0.000
South-West 0.067 0.171 South-West -0.072 0.123
East Anglia -0.044 0.415 East Anglia -0.047 0.343
North-West -0.086 0.056 North-West -0.044 0.290
East Midlands -0.091 0.049 East Midlands -0.067 0.121
West Midlands -0.069 0.134 West Midlands -0.086 0.048
Yorkshire -0.098 0.033 Yorkshire -0.109 0.011
Northern -0.172 0.001 Northern -0.309 0.000
Wales -0.187 0.000 Wales -0.120 0.010
Scotland -0.182 0.000 Scotland -0.145 0.001
F-stat. (p-value) 0.000 F-stat. (p-value) 0.000
Observations 1440 Observations 1413
19861992
Notes:  Estimates based on pooling 4 digit industries and regions, taking the UK as 
a whole as the base region.
Table 2: Estimation Results, Administrative Regions, UK Base
Administrative 
Region
σ = 2 
ρ = 0.5
Administrative 
Region
σ = 2 
ρ = 0.5
South-East 0.77 South-East 0.80
South-West 0.94 South-West 1.05
East Anglia 1.05 East Anglia 1.07
North-West 1.09 North-West 1.12
East Midlands 1.10 East Midlands 1.07
West Midlands 1.07 West Midlands 1.04
Yorkshire 1.10 Yorkshire 1.09
Northern 1.19 Northern 1.36
Wales 1.21 Wales 1.13
Scotland 1.20 Scotland 1.16
19861992
Notes:  Coefficients used to evaluate relative wage 
differences are from Table 1, based on pooling 4 digit 
industries and regions, taking the UK as a whole as the 
base region.
Table 3: Implied Quality-Adjusted Relative Wage Diﬀerences (CES Technology)
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Postcode Region Coeff
σ = 2 
ρ = 0.5 Postcode Region Coeff
σ = 2 
ρ = 0.5
Slough  0.195 0.82 Reading  0.187 0.83
Twickenham  0.236 0.79 Enfield  0.201 0.82
Swindon  0.237 0.79 Guildford  0.208 0.81
Hemel Hempstead 0.244 0.78 Swindon  0.283 0.75
Kingston  0.247 0.78 Slough  0.303 0.74
Redhill  0.271 0.76 Hemel Hempstead 0.311 0.73
Cambridge  0.298 0.74 Sutton  0.623 0.54
St Albans 0.364 0.69
Sutton  0.559 0.57
F-stat. (p-value) 0.00 F-stat. (p-value) 0.00
Observations 5044 Observations 5027
Positive and Significant Region Coefficients at the 10% Level
1992 1986
Notes:  Coefficients based on pooling 4 digit industries and postcode areas, taking the UK as 
a whole as the base region.  Listed regions have statistically significant positive coefficients 
at the 10% level.
Table 4: Postcode Areas With Positive and Significant Coeﬃcients, UK Base
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Postcode Region Coeff
σ = 2 
ρ = 0.5 Postcode Region Coeff
σ = 2 
ρ = 0.5
Llandrindod Wells -0.669 1.95 Dumfries  -0.504 1.66
Dumfries  -0.530 1.70 Aberdeen  -0.433 1.54
Chester  -0.432 1.54 Cleveland  -0.366 1.44
Galashiels  -0.392 1.48 Sunderland  -0.364 1.44
Watford  -0.364 1.44 Plymouth  -0.330 1.39
Sunderland  -0.357 1.43 Blackpool  -0.327 1.39
Exeter  -0.350 1.42 Cardiff  -0.322 1.38
Llandudno  -0.344 1.41 Kilmarnock  -0.319 1.38
Aberdeen  -0.322 1.38 Truro  -0.306 1.36
Peterborough  -0.285 1.33 Newcastle  -0.296 1.34
Plymouth  -0.282 1.33 Llandudno  -0.293 1.34
Durham  -0.260 1.30 Canterbury  -0.276 1.32
Doncaster  -0.249 1.28 Darlington  -0.273 1.31
Cleveland  -0.239 1.27 Wolverhampton  -0.252 1.29
Sheffield  -0.236 1.27 Wakefield  -0.251 1.29
Kilmarnock  -0.234 1.26 Halifax  -0.245 1.28
Cardiff  -0.221 1.25 Bradford  -0.231 1.26
Crewe  -0.218 1.24 Bath  -0.220 1.25
Walsall  -0.197 1.22 Sheffield  -0.210 1.23
Dudley  -0.190 1.21 Wigan  -0.208 1.23
Manchester  -0.171 1.19 Motherwell  -0.207 1.23
Wolverhampton  -0.167 1.18 Oldham  -0.200 1.22
Newport  -0.152 1.16 Nottingham  -0.188 1.21
Carlisle  -0.185 1.20
Walsall  -0.185 1.20
Hull  -0.181 1.20
Dudley  -0.174 1.19
F-stat. (p-value) 0.00 F-stat. (p-value) 0.00
Observations 5044 Observations 5027
1992 1986
Notes:  Coefficients based on pooling 4 digit industries and postcode areas, taking the UK as 
a whole as the base region.  Listed regions have statistically significant negative coefficients 
at the 10% level.
Negative and Significant Region Coefficients at the 10% Level
Table 5: Postcode Areas With Positive and Significant Coeﬃcients,
UK Base
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Region Definition
5% Level of 
Significance
10% Level of 
Significance Minumim Mean Maximum
Administrative Regions
1992 0.46 0.57 2 5 9
1986 0.37 0.40 2 4 9
Postcode Areas
1992 0.11 0.17 6 19 50
1986 0.12 0.19 5 22 74
Fraction of All Region-Pairs 
Rejecting FPE
Distribution of Rejections 
Across All Base Regions at the 
10% Level of Significance
Notes:  Bilateral regressions use each region, in turn, as a base region in testing for 
factor price equality.  These regressions analyze wage bills across 4 digit industries in 10 
Adminstrative Regions and 111 Postcode Areas.  The first two columns report the share 
of rejections out of the total number of possible rejections.  Total possible bilateral 
rejections are 90 and 12,210 for Administrative Regions and Postcode Areas, 
respectively.  The final three columns given the minimum, mean and maximum number 
of rejections for each base region.  Total possible rejections for each base region are 9 
and 110 for Administrative Regions and Postcode Areas, respectively.  
Table 6: Bilateral Region-Pair Rejections
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Administrative 
Region
South-East 0.263 * 0.200 * 0.232 * 0.280 * 0.256 *
South-West 0.067 0.115 * 0.005 -0.013 0.015
East Anglia -0.044 0.049 0.055 0.062 -0.053
North-West -0.086 -0.049 -0.015 -0.076 -0.072
East Midlands -0.091 * -0.043 -0.035 -0.086 -0.030
West Midlands -0.069 -0.060 -0.063 -0.120 * -0.056
Yorkshire -0.098 * -0.059 -0.037 -0.094 * -0.074
Northern -0.172 * -0.129 * -0.101 * -0.214 * -0.347 *
Wales -0.187 * -0.133 * -0.103 * -0.227 * -0.196 *
Scotland -0.182 * -0.214 * -0.129 * -0.161 * -0.151 *
F-stat. (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1440 1317 1551 1309 593
Notes:  * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.  Column (1) reports results from Table 1.  
Column (2) reports results based upon a sample of single plant establishments.  Column (3) reports 
results where establishment-level data are allocated to plants on the basis of their shares of 
establishment employment.  Column (4) reports results for the population of establishments with 
more than 100 employees.  Column (5) reports results where region-industry pairs are excluded if 
they have fewer than five establishments. 
Base Results
Single Plant 
Establishments
At Least 5 
Establishments Per 
Region-Industry 
Pair
Establishments 
with >100 
employees
Plant-level 
Estimation 
Results
Table 7: 1992 Administrative Region Coeﬃcients For Various Specifications
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Figure 1: Multiple Cones of Diversification
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Greater London
Scotland
North
Yorkshire & Humberside
East Anglia
North West
Wales
South West South East
East Midlands
West Midlands
1.64 to 6.00
-1.64 to 1.64
-4.00 to -1.64
Figure 2: Administrative Region Estimates, 1992
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Postcode areas and cones
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-1.64 to 1.64
-10.00 to -1.64
1992 10%
Figure 3: Postcode Area Estimates, 1992
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